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**STATEMENT BY  
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**BEFORE THE  
COMMISSION ON WARTIME CONTRACTING  
DECEMBER 18, 2009**

## **Introduction**

Chairman Thibault, Chairman Shays, Members of the Commission: I am especially pleased to appear before you today to represent DynCorp International's 2,300 employees supporting the Afghanistan Civilian Advisor Support program to mentor and train the Afghan National Police. As President Obama described in his West Point address on Afghanistan, developing the capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces is essential to successfully securing the population and stabilizing Afghanistan.

At DynCorp International we do not build satellites. We do not design aircraft. We do training and mentoring. That is our core competency – and this competency is represented in the DNA of our 30,000 employees worldwide.

Since 2003, DynCorp International has partnered with the United States Government building the capacity and professionalism of the Afghan National Police. Working closely with the Department of State; the Department of Defense; the Afghan Ministry of Interior; and the Afghan National Police throughout the country, our police-training programs, including our efforts to support Focused District Development and In-District Reform, have consistently received high marks for outstanding performance. We are fully accountable and transparent in our activities, and welcome at all levels of our program the contract oversight and operational coordination with the U.S. State Department and the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A).

As the Commission is well aware, increasing Afghanistan's overall capability to provide police presence, improve public security, and support the rule of law continues to be a deeply challenging undertaking and many hard lessons have been learned along the way. While acknowledging the difficulties and occasional setbacks, over the past six years DynCorp International has worked hand in glove with our United States Government partners to develop, refine, and expand the impressive "train the trainer" program through which a cadre of Afghan trainers now conducts over ninety percent of all training at the Central and Regional Training Centers. DynCorp International police mentors at the police training centers continue to refine the curriculum, teach advanced courses and

provide oversight to the Afghan instructors who we have trained to carry out the hands-on instruction of Afghan police and new recruits.

In addition to overseeing training center instruction, our mentors, who are all sworn American police officers with significant law enforcement experience, are embedded in U.S. military Police Mentor Teams that provide oversight and monitoring of fielded police at the district level. DynCorp International advisors also provide mentoring through independent teams to Regional and Provincial Afghan National Police Headquarters and personnel, as well as the Afghan National Civil Order Police; Border Police; Women's Police Corps; and Family Response Units. Over the life of our contract, we have developed and refined the curriculum, constructed and run the Regional Training Centers, developed a cadre of Afghan police instructors, mentored and monitored Afghan District Police in the field, and advised senior officials in the Ministry of the Interior.

As an integral element in the program to develop Afghanistan's police force, we are contributing to peace, stability and democracy in Afghanistan and it is an honor for me, for my company, and for every person who serves on the Civilian Police (CIVPOL) program to participate in this significant and critical effort.

The contract to train the Afghan National Police is currently managed by the Department of State's Civilian Police program in the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The contract is funded by the Department of Defense and CSTC-A has developed the requirements for our personnel and is the end-user of the program. DynCorp International has provided and supported civilian police advisors in Afghanistan since the company was competitively awarded the original work in 2003 and has been competitively re-awarded the work since then. Under the current contract DynCorp International is tasked with managing all elements of the program to include: Training (Mentors and Advisors); Base Life Support; Security; and IT/Communications.

As you are no doubt aware, the current contract is being transferred from the Department of State to the Department of Defense and re-competed under the Counter-Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office (CNTPO) in the Space and

Missile Defense Command. The Department of Defense has also indicated its intention to split the existing work into two distinct task orders: 1) Trainers (Mentors and Advisors), and 2) Base Life Support, Security, and IT/Communications.

The CNTPO contract is an existing Multiple Award Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity contract for acquiring equipment, material and services to support the technology development/application of new counterdrug technologies. The multiple awards were made in 2007 to five contractors. Given the Request for Proposal's focus on manufacturing and technology, DynCorp International did not bid on the base CNTPO contract and is not a pre-qualified CNTPO contractor. None of the five pre-qualified CNTPO contractors has included DynCorp International on their team for the new training Task Order for the Department of Defense.

DynCorp International understands and supports the underlying rationale for this transfer of responsibility to the Department of Defense. However, we have substantial and substantive concerns related to the planned procurement strategy through the United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command's Counter-Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office. Specifically, we are convinced the Space and Missile Defense Command's planned procurement strategy is procedurally and legally flawed, and accordingly we are protesting the utilization of the Space and Missile Defense Command/CNTPO contract vehicle.

Even while we pursue this legal course of action, the mission of training, mentoring, and building the Afghan National Police, under the State Department contract and operational command responsibility of CSTC-A continues unaffected.

### **Operational Footprint**

The Afghanistan Civilian Advisory Support program currently has over 2,300 employees working at fifty-three sites dispersed throughout Afghanistan, to include the Central Training Center (Kabul); the seven Regional Training Centers

(Kandahar, Gardez, Jalalabad, Konduz, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat and Bamiyan); the Andrascan training facility for the Afghanistan National Civil Order Police; and embedded at Forward Operating Bases in police districts around the country. Today, our training workforce consists of seven hundred fifty-seven civilian police advisors and twenty-five Professional and Executive Mentors who advise senior officials in the Afghan Ministry of Interior. Eighty-five percent of police advisors and mentors are currently serving outside of the training centers and at the regional and district levels. In addition to the police advisors and mentors, roughly one thousand five hundred members of the team serve in support functions, to include life and mission support; security; and IT/communications.

DynCorp International's civilian police advisors and mentors currently serving in Afghanistan are highly qualified: fifty-four percent have at least fifteen years of law enforcement experience; fifty-two percent have previously served in the military; and fifty percent have command experience. As important as recruiting advisors and mentors with unequaled qualifications, we must deploy the right people who are dedicated to the mission, and DynCorp International sets the standard for employee retention rates.

While the sheer number of personnel and the experience level required to execute the contract demonstrates the scale of the program, it does not fully depict the complexity of sustaining day-to-day operations. DynCorp International is presently accountable for over seventy-five thousand items of equipment, including close to four hundred vehicles. We maintain seventeen dining facilities, capable of being supported by air if ground travel is not possible. We provide independent fuel and other base support services at each facility. With the mountainous terrain, severe winter weather, and risks from Improvised Explosive Devices and hostile fire, providing reliable and efficient support to the Regional Training facilities is a daily challenge. I am proud to point out that our record of managing this challenge is not just good – it is outstanding.

In a combat zone, our mentors and advisors are all armed, in order to ensure that they are capable of self-protection. They operate under strict Rules for the Use of Force but have had to use their weapons in self-defense on occasions, including when deployed in the field with CSTC-A Police Mentor Teams. Additionally, under the contract DynCorp International provides for the static

security of Camp Gibson in Kabul, the Central Training Facility, and the seven Regional Training Facilities located around the country. DynCorp International strictly adheres to the laws of Afghanistan and as such we have all required licenses and permits to do business in Afghanistan, and to maintain weapons and ammunition.

Contract performance not only relies upon proven internal capabilities, but also the ability to vet, clear and manage subcontractors. Today we have agreements with over fifty subcontractors in Afghanistan, a majority of which are Afghan companies, to provide a wide spectrum of services, including food and fuel supply. Without the required infrastructure, subcontracts and management systems operating efficiently and effectively, the training mission would be placed at unnecessary risk. Given our years of experience operating in Afghanistan on this program and other Department of State and Department of Defense programs, we have developed a stable of reliable subcontractors who provide basic support services.

### **Police Training Today**

Today, DynCorp International is charged with executing three distinct, mutually reinforcing training programs in Afghanistan. The training programs include:

- ***Basic Police Course “Basic 8”***: the eight week basic training course provided to Afghan National Police recruits at the Regional Training Centers. DynCorp International’s train-the-trainer program has built a cadre of Afghan instructors who now conduct over ninety percent of the instruction at the training centers. DynCorp International Police Advisors oversee the Afghan instructors who provide hands-on training in local languages to ensure lessons and techniques are taught properly and to recommend refinements to the curriculum as needed. The Basic Eight curriculum teaches the recruits basic law enforcement techniques as well as self-defense skills. Because of the low literacy rate of most recruits, course instruction is hands-on with a low instructor-to-student ration.

To evaluate and improve the effectiveness of instructors and students, DynCorp International mentors developed and implemented the Student Core Competencies Program in October of 2007. This performance

evaluation program is a quantifiable evaluation tool designed to assess student core competencies. Afghan instructors and DynCorp International mentors evaluate ANP student performance in the following classes: Firearms; Human Rights; Defensive Baton; Empty Hand Techniques; Civil Disturbance; Use of Force; Handcuffing and Person Searches; Basic First Aid; Advanced First Aid (TTP); Crime Scene Management; Check Points; Police Station Security; Explosive Devices; Domestic Violence; Afghanistan Constitution and Tactical Training Program. Students participate in both verbal and practical exercises to demonstrate their understanding of the required subject matter and concepts.

- ***Focused District Development (FDD)***: a program to reform the Afghan National Police and improve elements of the Rule of Law. Under the Focused District Development program, Afghan National Police units are removed from their home districts and replaced with the Afghanistan National Civil Order Police, the country's elite police force. The unit to be trained travels to a Regional Training Center to undergo basic training and reconstitution. After training the units are returned to their home district, they continue training for eight additional weeks, with mentoring, monitoring, and evaluation by a Police Mentor Team, consisting of two DynCorp Civilian Police Advisors, two interpreters and a squad of US military personnel.
- ***In-District Reform (IDR)***: similar to the FDD program, IDR also runs for eight weeks. The key difference in the training programs is that in IDR police are replaced by US military personnel and after six weeks of individual training, the police recruits spend two weeks learning collective skills with their fellow police officers in their home districts. When units return to the field they continue training with the assistance of Civilian Police Advisors and members of the United States Marine Corps serving in Police Mentor Teams.

## **Challenges to Success**

The Afghan National Police training program faces substantial challenges that are not easily overcome, but this does not mean objectives cannot be achieved. Major challenges include but are not limited to:

- Recruit literacy rates estimated to be around 20-30%
- High rates of drug usage among potential recruits
- Cultural acceptance of corruption
- 26% attrition rate
- Low pay
- Extremely high casualty rates

While substantial focus, rightfully, has been placed on literacy rates, drug use, corruption and attrition; more needs to be placed on recruiting, pay and casualty issues. The Taliban takes very seriously the potential threat to the control of villages posed by the presence of the Afghan National Police and the targeting of the police reflects this concern. Members of the Afghan National Police are almost four times as likely to be killed or wounded as their Army counterparts. On the past Monday alone, sixteen police officers were killed in two insurgent led attacks. Given these facts in conjunction with the inability to sufficiently support or protect one's family, it is not difficult to see how a policeman may be corrupted or simply walk away.

Today, most Afghan police are willing to protect and serve their countrymen in spite of the risks to their safety and livelihoods. Another mitigating factor in high attrition rates is that private companies, embassies and international organizations offer significantly higher pay for trained security officers than offered by the Afghan National Police. It has also been reported that the Taliban pays more than the government. All of these factors demonstrate the difficulty in maintaining high retention rates and in preventing policemen from being lured away for safer and often more profitable livelihoods.

## **Lessons Learned**

As with any major program, DynCorp International, our United States Government partners and our Afghan counterparts have learned many lessons and are continuously incorporating them into our training curriculum and program of instruction. Key lessons learned include:



- Producing a national police force where one never existed before is hard. When confronted with an active insurgency capable of extreme violence; in a society where corruption, drug use and literacy/language are endemic; it is even harder. If the goal is to produce a national police force with basic law enforcement skills that have the trust of the population, the effort is worth the difficulty.
- Quality matters – discussions related to the Afghan National Police lately have focused on the need to increase the end strength of the force. While in theory more police are better, deployed police must have basic law enforcement skills necessary to win the trust and confidence of the local population. Note – in Iraq, police recruits currently train for twelve weeks with a student population that is mostly literate.

If we are serious about growing the end strength of the Afghan National Police, more trainers, mentors and facilities are needed. Simply increasing the number of recruits and reducing the training cycle will not produce a capability to serve the needs of the population in the long term.

- The addition of US military units, such as elements of the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne and the 48<sup>th</sup> Brigade Combat Team of the Georgia National Guard; and European National Police, such as the Italian Carabinieri and French Gendarmerie, are welcome supplements to the training program. However, neither our military nor European National police were formed or trained to teach basic law enforcement skills.

Sworn officers who are certified field training experts remain essential. A police force with basic law enforcement skills is one of the three pillars of the rule of law. The other two are a viable judiciary and a humane corrections system. The focus on police is appropriate, but without development of the other two pillars, law and order will continue to be challenged.

- More Police Mentor Teams and extended mentoring are necessary; two per district for roughly eight weeks is simply not enough. The best way to increase professionalism and to weed out corruption is to increase and expand mentorship in the field. Police Mentor Teams provide a virtual conscience and help to modify individual and unit behavior, which leads to reduced corruption.

- Afghan involvement in the training and fielding of the Afghan National Police needs to be substantially increased. Train the trainer programs and turning over control of training and support functions at the Central and Regional Training Centers is critical. Our goal is to put ourselves out of business.

## **Recommendations**

Based upon DynCorp International experience in implementing the Afghan National Police training contract for the past five years, we submit several recommendations related to the future program. They are:

- When developing training and mentoring programs, contract vehicles excluding the industry experts will not provide best practice or best value. The United States Government is best served when contracts attract and provide access to the best experience and best practices in the industry.
- Focus on quality of police being trained and not simply on quantity produced. Number trained is an ineffective metric for determining the capacity and capability of the Afghan National Police.
- Increase the capacity of the Central and Regional Training Centers and expand commensurately the number of Afghan instructors and US mentors and advisors.
- Enlarge the train-the-trainer efforts, developing Afghan mentors and advisors; establish certification-based metrics for the transfer of responsibility from US to Afghan management of the Training Centers.
- Increase the number of Police Mentor Teams and lengthen the period that they mentor and oversee deployed police. Increased and longer-term district level mentorship increases individual and unit level law enforcement skills, while also reducing corrupt activities.
- Supervision of contracts and contractors should not be divided between the Department of Defense, Department of State and other government agencies; there should be one clear requirements, management and contracting organization to provide direction to contractors.

In addition to strengthening the acquisition workforce and contract oversight capabilities as has been discussed extensively in previous

hearings and reports, the Commission may want to examine the creation of an over-arching contracting office or function intended to support whole of government efforts and reduce the natural tension created when different agencies have overlapping responsibilities on a singular contract.

- In war zone contracting, contracting authority should be “pushed into the field,” with contracting officers and contracting officers representatives having sufficient authority to be able to rapidly modify contract terms to meet the requirements of the Combatant Commander, while still protecting contractors from “at-risk” work. It is impractical for the contracting officer to oversee, monitor, and direct a contract from a location in the US, many time zones away from the work, without a visceral understanding of combat conditions.
- As our CEO Bill Ballhaus has discussed previously before the Commission, there has been much discussion about reforming and improving the Defense Base Act which mandates contractors provide workers' compensation insurance for their employees. The system needs to be reformed to better serve the needs of the wounded and the families of the deceased. What is also needed is a well resourced and funded support network to assist individuals and families in explaining procedures, benefits, and claims management; and to provide moral support in a time of great trauma.

DynCorp International recognized the critical need and void in this area by establishing and funding the CIVPOL Employee Assistance Program to assist wounded personnel and the families of those killed in action. We again encourage the Commission to study the program to see if might be an effective model to use for a government mandated and funded program to close the gap in care and support that exists today.

## **Conclusion**

I would like to thank the fine men and women working on the DynCorp International Afghanistan Civilian Advisor Support program team today. We increasingly hear only the bad news when it comes to overseas contractors, but I think you would be hard-pressed to find a more dedicated, focused and qualified workforce anywhere than the one we are lucky enough to have supporting this

program in Afghanistan today. The work is always challenging and often dangerous, to date thirty-seven of our employees, including six in Afghanistan, have paid the ultimate sacrifice in support of the civilian police training mission world-wide.

Everyday our employees serve side by side with their United States and allied military and diplomatic counterparts supporting our National Security and Foreign policy objectives while also trying to make a meaningful contribution to the longer-term peace and stability of Afghanistan. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the Commission today and I stand ready to answer any questions you may have.

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Donald Ryder joined DynCorp International in 2008 and is the Vice President and Program Manager for the Civilian Police (CIVPOL) program.

Donald Ryder was a United States Army officer in the Military Police branch. Ryder was commissioned in 1971. He was promoted to Major General in 2001. He served as the Commanding General for the Army's Criminal Investigation Division, and was also the top Army Law Enforcement officer as the US Army Provost Marshal General. Ryder retired from the United States Army in 2006.